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Introduction 
Over the last year or so the mobile telecommunications industry has 
undergone a complete sea change; the initial euphoria surrounding the 
German and UK licensing process, where widely optimistic claims about the 
array of possible services and uptake were made, has been replaced by 
widespread anxiety and pessimism.  This anxiety and pessimism is driven by 
the large debts that companies have incurred to enter the market, doubts as 
to the validity of claims that 3G will usher in a whole new era of service 
development and the increasing belief that subscribers will not migrate in the 
required numbers to the new technology.   
What has caused this sea change in opinion?  The first factor that must 
be taken into account is the enormous financial investment that 3G 
represents.  To date, the 3G licensing process across the European Union 
(EU) has raised more than €110bn for Member State governments.  
Successful licensees have been obliged to increase their borrowings, and at 
one stage the licence costs alone accounted for a third of BT's and KPN's 
total debts and nearly all of Telefonica's (The Economist, 2001: 71).  However, 
to the licence costs must be added the other costs that the successful bidder 
will incur, namely those arising from the construction of the network as well 
as the development of the necessary services to attract subscribers. The 
Economist (2001: 71) estimates that roughly the same amount will be 
required for network construction as was spent on the licences. 
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Secondly, questions have also been raised as to the viability of 3G 
services. As part of the bidding process for the licence all the operators 
enthusiastically discussed the range and nature of the services that they 
intended to offer if successful. These services combine voice with video and 
data, are available over a variety of devices and, broadly speaking, fall into 
the categories of information, communication, productivity and entertainment 
related.  At present, however, the exact nature of the services to be offered 
over 3G networks remains open to speculation, as no operator has yet 
begun to offer services with the limited exception of NTT DoCoMo (Japan) 
and Manx Telecom (Isle of Man). On several occasions, companies have 
announced their intention to begin trials, only subsequently to delay them.  
Furthermore, the development of the requisite technology for 3G has not 
progressed as anticipated. Vodafone has warned that the range of services 
to be offered by its 3G networks will be limited and too slow for 
entertainment services such as live video or music whilst others have 
suggested that 3G will merely be a stepping stone on the road to 4G 
technologies (ROBERTS, 2001a: 23 & 2001b: 1). 
The huge financial cost of securing the licences, coupled with 
technological delays has given rise to uncertainty that has been transferred 
outwards from the mobile sector by the interwoven nature of the 
telecommunications industry. Not only do many PTOs (public telephone 
operators) like Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom also operate large 
mobile networks, but a large number of the successful bidders for 3G 
licences in the EU are joint ventures. The uncertainty has been manifested 
in four ways. Firstly, share prices have declined.  For instance, the share 
price of Sonera, the Finnish mobile group with four EU 3G licences has 
fallen from a March 2000 peak of €97 to €3.30 on Oct 1 2001. The fall in 
Sonera's share price is not all that unusual given that companies ranging 
from Lucent to France Telecom, Nokia and Vodafone have all experienced 
declines of more than 50% since July 2000 (CURWEN, 2001b). 
Secondly, senior executives have departed as they have been blamed for 
excessively exposing their companies to the vagaries of 3G. The price of an 
institutionally acceptable debt reducing rights issue by BT was widely seen 
as being the departure of Sir Iain Vallance, and Kaj-Erik Relander resigned 
as Sonera chief executive as concerns over the company's future mounted.  
Thirdly, the debt ratings of the major European telecommunications 
companies have been downgraded by the likes of Standard & Poor's as 
borrowings have increased and future prospects have become less rosy.  
The financial position of many telecommunications companies has declined, 
with some companies such as KPN and Sonera being rated just above the 
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lowest investment grade. Any further decline in the rating will result in the 
large financial institutions selling their holdings, as below this level they will 
not hold the debt. 
Fourthly, telecommunication companies have announced, and have 
begun to implement, far-reaching restructuring plans.  BT spun off its mobile 
subsidiary, mmO2 (formerly BT Wireless) in late 2001, and has sold its 
hitherto core Yell subsidiary whilst France Telecom has floated a small stake 
in Orange, its global mobile subsidiary. It is in this last area, of 
reorganisation and restructuring, that attention in this paper will be focused.  
The underlying premise of the paper is that the financial difficulties of 
companies, primarily arising from the cost of participating in 3G, is driving 
the reorganisation and restructuring of the telecommunications industry.  
The lack of any 'killer application', and doubts over the ability of the services 
to live up to initial expectations, ensures that the role of services here is to 
exacerbate the problems faced by 3G license winners by not offering the 
prospect that service revenues will be sufficient to service the level of debts 
incurred.  Moreover, services will only provide revenues in the future yet the 
problems faced by companies are imminent. Thus, companies have no 
choice but to resort to organisational solutions to remedy the financial 
problems that they face. 
Although examples are drawn from across the telecommunications 
industry, they are here largely drawn from the smaller companies, as these 
are the ones that have most acutely felt the financial and organisational 
pressures emanating from 3G. The smaller telecommunications companies 
also feature prominently among those rumoured to be involved in industry 
consolidation, through either the sale of their mobile operations to another 
company or by their merger with another PTO. In addition, the financial and 
organisational problems of the smaller companies have been transferred to 
the larger companies through the web of cross-holdings that bind the 
industry together, as well as by altering how the industry is viewed by 
analysts, investors, banks and so forth. The organisational and market 
repercussions of 3G are addressed in the following main section that is 
divided into three parts. In the first part infrastructure sharing between 3G 
license winners is dealt with, whilst in the second mergers and acquisition 
activity is examined. The third part focuses on the organisational form of 3G 
license winners and network scale. Conclusions are then drawn in the final 
main section. 
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Organisational and market repercussions  
Infrastructure sharing 
Infrastructure sharing involves two or more mobile operators using all or 
some of the same infrastructure to deliver their 3G services, and has been 
seen by many as a way to reduce their financial burdens. However, although 
infrastructure sharing has been widely commented on as a way for operators 
to reduce the substantial investment required to build their 3G networks, only 
in three countries – Sweden, UK and Germany – have companies indicated 
their willingness to cooperate and share infrastructure if permitted by the 
regulatory authorities. 
In Sweden two infrastructure sharing joint ventures have been 
established. The first joint venture is between Telia and Tele2 (formerly 
Netcom AB), whilst the second is between Europolitan Vodafone, Hi3G 
Access and Orange Sverige. Two explanations can be offered for the 
willingness of these companies to collaborate with one another.  After failing 
in its 3G application to gain a licence, Telia formed its joint venture with 
Tele2 to effect its entry into the marketplace. In contrast, the other three 
companies viewed the joint venture as a way of reducing the cost of building 
their 3G networks.  It was envisaged by Europolitan and Hi3G that the joint 
building and maintenance of 70% of their network would save them both 
around 30% of their infrastructure spending (GEORGE, 2001a: 34).  Although 
the later inclusion of Orange Sverige into their joint venture will offer the 
potential for further savings, these are likely to be small as the joint venture 
excludes Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo where the companies are 
required to build their own separate networks. 
The second market where infrastructure sharing has been announced is 
Germany. In July 2001 BT Wireless and T-Mobile announced that they 
would share one another's infrastructure within Germany and the UK. Within 
Germany this infrastructure sharing is limited to passive network 
components like sites, masts and power supplies (BENOIT & MALKANI, 2001b: 
27). Roaming agreements would also be established in both countries in 
areas of low population density, thereby resulting in one party becoming a 
virtual operator in parts of the country. Cost reduction appears to the 
principal motive, with BT stating that it estimates capital expenditure savings 
of €2bn over the next ten years (BENOIT & MALKANI, 2001a).  Furthermore, 
BT also expects that its population coverage will be built out faster so that it 
will cover half, rather than a quarter, of the German population by 2003. 
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However, analysts have argued that the scope for immediate cost 
savings within Germany is limited because of the regulatory regime. Viag 
Interkom (the German operation of mmO2) is required to meet its licence 
obligation regarding population coverage with its own infrastructure. Thus, 
any savings from roaming agreements with T-Mobile will come after this has 
occurred. In addition, larger savings would come from sharing the 'active' 
parts of the network, such as base stations and controlling / switching 
equipment (BENOIT & MALKANI, 2001b: 27). When the relevant technology 
becomes available, the scope for savings will be further expanded to the 
extent that they outweigh those from the passive parts of the network. 
Whilst infrastructure sharing is attractive to many operators, it has not 
been universally welcomed.  Many countries prohibited infrastructure sharing 
in the licences on the grounds that it is anti-competitive (The Economist, 2001: 
72).  The sharing of infrastructure will encourage companies to collude with 
one another, and any cost savings that arise from the sharing will not be 
passed on to end users. Those companies not wanting to participate in 
infrastructure sharing have been critical, not least because they fear being 
placed at a competitive disadvantage. Furthermore, some of the gains from 
competition, such as service innovation, may not be as readily forthcoming if 
infrastructure competition is widespread. 
Regulatory opinion as to the attractiveness of infrastructure sharing is 
divided. Fearing collusion between operators, the EU has been guarded in 
its comments and has only recently welcomed infrastructure sharing if 
customers do not suffer (Dombey, 2001a, 2001b & 2001c), whereas the 
German regulator, RegTP, has agreed to infrastructure sharing providing 
certain conditions are met (RegTP, 2001).  Although RegTP did not alter 
coverage targets and other aspects of the licence, the clarification 
emphasises how operators may share infrastructure and establish roaming 
agreements to achieve these targets.   
Mergers and acquisitions 
Categorically identifying merger and acquisition (M&A) activity that is the 
result of the 3G licensing process is fraught with difficulties, primarily 
because M&A activities can originate from such a wide range of factors and 
because 3G has exacerbated many trends / issues already present within 
the telecommunications industry. Having said this, it is possible to identify 
several instances of M&A activity where 3G played a key, if not determining, 
role. 
182 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES no. 45 
The first of these instances is the series of events that led to Hutchison 
Whampoa re-entering the UK market as Hutchison 3G Holdings UK Ltd.  In 
the UK 3G auction process, Telesystems International Wireless (TIW) paid 
£4.387bn for the fifth and largest licence that was reserved for new entrants.  
Subsequent to the completion of the auction, TIW formed a joint venture with 
Hutchison Whampoa whereby a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) 
would be formed and owned 9.9% and 90.1% respectively by TIW and 
Hutchison Whampoa. TIW would construct the network and make capacity 
available to the MVNO. At the same time, Hutchison Whampoa agreed to 
support a credit line taken out by TIW that would fund the network's 
construction.  However, the two companies subsequently re-organised their 
relationship with the effective result being that TIW exited the UK. In July 
2000 the MVNO and TIW were merged together and shares in the resulting 
entity sold to both NTT DoCoMo (20%) and KPN Mobile (15%). Hutchison 
Whampoa held the remaining 65%, though TIW was granted the option to 
acquire 6.5% of the company by November 2000. TIW did not take up this 
option. The most likely explanation for this is that expansion plans 
elsewhere, as well as the continued capital requirements of Dolphin 
Telecom, its European subsidiary, ensured that TIW could not afford the 
investment. 
Telenor, the Norwegian PTO, brings together two potential sets of 
mergers and acqusitions activity, one centred around BT and the other on 
the Nordic regional market. In late 2000 and early 2001 Telenor withdrew 
from three joint ventures with BT: Viag Interkom (Germany), Esat (Ireland) 
and Telenordia (Sweden). In the case of the former two joint ventures, 
Telenor exercised options that led to BT acquiring its stake for a combined 
total of NOK 30.8bn (€3.85bn / £2.36bn). Telenordia was divided between 
BT and Telenor, with BT receiving the business operations, and Telenor the 
mobile operations. 
This substantial transfer of resources from BT to Telenor contributed to, 
and exacerbated, the financial problems of BT as it came on top of larger 
than anticipated 3G licence payments in the UK and Germany, as well as 
the August 2000 purchase of E.ON's 45% stake in Viag Interkom for 
€6.65bn.  This limited the ability of BT to strengthen its holdings in AirTel and 
Japan Telecom / J-Phone. In late 2000, Vodafone acquired an additional 
52.1% of Airtel from a variety of shareholders thereby bringing its total stake 
to 73.8%. This significantly reduced the influence that BT could exert over 
AirTel, as the company switched from being one of the largest minority 
shareholders to effectively become a passive investor in a company 
controlled by Vodafone. Similarly, from December 2000 onwards, Vodafone 
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acquired shares in Japan Telecom to complement its existing shareholding 
in the Japan Phone Group (which is the operating subsidiary of Japan 
Telecom) from AT&T, West Japan Rail Company and Central Japan Rail 
Company. This increased Vodafone's stake to 25% compared to BT's 20%. 
BT was unable to respond as it lacked the financial resources to acquire 
additional shares to bolster its position. Although both companies expressed 
a desire to work with one another the presence of two telecommunications 
companies was bound to be problematic. Vodafone exploited its superior 
financial position vis-à-vis BT by buying for cash the latter's holdings in 
AirTel, Japan Telecom and Japan Phone Group for £4.8bn in May 2001.  
Not only did this free resources for BT to use elsewhere, on debt reduction 
for example, but it also enabled Vodafone to become the sole 
telecommunications company in these joint ventures. The sale of these 
assets exited BT from markets that it had repeatedly stated were 
strategically important, and when combined with the sale of other assets 
ensured that when mmO2 was spun off its operational scope was limited to 
just a handful of European markets. 
Recently there has been much discussion as to whether a Nordic 
telecommunications company will emerge through one of several mergers.  
These rumours focus on the merger of the PTOs from Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden and the expansion of the resulting company into the 
remaining Nordic markets.  It has been suggested that Telia has held merger 
talks with both Tele Danmark and Sonera, but that it will merge with only one 
of these two companies (STENEBERG, 2001). This comes after its very public 
failed 1999 merger with Telenor of Norway and subsequent expansion into 
that market through the purchase of NetCom ASA (GEORGE, CRISCIONE & 
MacCARTHY, 2001: 33).  Although Telenor is reported to have held talks with 
SBC Communications about buying its 46.2% stake in Tele Danmark 
(GEORGE & MacCARTHY, 2001: 31), and that the sale of assets enhanced its 
financial position, it would appear that the strategic priorities of Telenor no 
longer lie in merging with one of its fellow Nordic PTOs. Indeed, the 
acquisition of additional shares in Pannon GSM for €1002m suggests that 
the ambitions of Telenor lie elsewhere in Europe. This deal reduced the 
ability of Telenor to participate in any Nordic consolidation from a position of 
financial strength. 
As a consequence, the formation of any Nordic telecommunications is 
likely to involve the merger of Telia with either Tele Danmark or Sonera.  
Merging with either Sonera or Tele Danmark will present quite different 
challenges and opportunities to Telia. A merger with Tele Danmark would 
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provide Telia with a presence in Denmark to add to its existing operations in 
Sweden, Norway and a newly awarded 3G licence in Finland. It would also 
reinforce its position as the largest Nordic telecommunications company. It 
is, however, by no means certain that Telia and Tele Danmark will be able to 
agree on merger terms. Moreover, Tele Danmark's largest shareholder, SBC 
Communications may be unwilling to accept the shares that Telia has 
intimated it is wanting to use to fund any acquisition (BROWNE-HUMES, 2001: 
28). 
A merger with Sonera would be advantageous in three ways for Telia.  
Firstly, it would be cheaper than a merger with Tele Danmark. Secondly, the 
Finnish government, which owns 53% of Sonera, is likely to accept equity, 
as this would allow them to benefit from any future recovery in 
telecommunication share prices. Thirdly, a merger with Sonera would greatly 
expand Telia's presence in the European 3G market as the Finnish company 
holds licenses in Finland, Germany, Italy and Spain. Sonera did successfully 
bid for a Norwegian 3G licence but returned it after its partner, Enitel, 
withdrew to focus on other markets.  Sonera concluded that building out the 
network alone was too expensive, not least because the failure to acquire a 
Swedish 3G licence limited the opportunities for scale economies across 
Scandinavia (GEORGE, 2001B; SONERA, 2001). 
The handing back of the Norwegian licence vividly demonstrated the 
weakened financial position of Sonera. Since mid 2001 Sonera has sought 
to rectify this position; through the sale of assets as well as a December 
2001 rights issue it has managed to reduce its debt burden by more than 
half to €2.7bn (SONERA, 2002). However, it has failed to address the root 
cause of its financial difficulties, namely, its four 3G licences that it remains 
committed to. Until it does Sonera will remain financially vulnerable and will 
not participate in any Nordic consolidation, as the dowry it brings to the table 
are the financial uncertainties and liabilities of its 3G licences and not a 
series of established and significant investments across Europe. Although it 
would now appear that the merger proposals have collapsed, the same 
significant obstacles remain if the merger was ever to be revived. 
Joint ventures, wholly owned subsidiaries and network scale 
Taking the 55 licences awarded to date across the EU as our basis, 
several characteristics of the organisational form used to bid for the licence 
can be identified. It is clear from the licences so far awarded that the 
organisational forms used fall into one of four categories – wholly owned 
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subsidiaries, companies with a majority shareholder, joint ventures with two 
or more telecommunications present and joint ventures. Although one or two 
of the wholly owned subsidiaries are new entrants into the marketplace, for 
example, Hutchison 3G Austria, the majority are in fact subsidiaries of 
incumbent 2G operators. The UK in particular demonstrates this, as the four 
incumbent 2G operators, which are wholly owned by their respective parent 
companies, each received a 3G licence. The fifth licence is operated by the 
only joint venture, Hutchison 3G UK Holdings Ltd. 
The remainder of the successful licence bidders are collaborative. The 
pros and cons of joint ventures are well known; joint ventures allow risk to be 
borne by more than one company and allow companies to benefit from the 
competences and assets of other companies. However, associated with joint 
ventures are control and trust problems that often lead to their breakdown.  
Companies may disagree over strategy, or use the close contact with other 
companies to learn new competences before launching themselves in 
competition.  As some of the licences have been awarded to companies that 
have a majority shareholder they have avoided many, if not all, of the trust 
and control problems associated with joint ventures whilst at the same time 
sharing the risk inherent to the investment with others. Examples of majority 
shareholders are Vodafone (Omintel, Europolitan, Telecel and Airtel) and 
Hutchison Whampoa (Hutchison 3G Holdings UK Ltd and Hi3G). 
KPN Mobile initially acquired shares in E-Plus in December 1999, that is, 
before the 3G licensing process began. This acquisition considerably added 
to KPN's debt burden, a debt burden that was significantly exacerbated by 
participation in the 3G licensing process in Germany. In late 2001 E-Plus 
accounted for €13.3bn out of KPN's total debt load of €21.9bn (Total 
Telecom, 2001). As KPN's debt increased, and the company struggled to 
bring it under control, both its share price and credit rating declined and 
speculation mounted that KPN would need to 'do something drastic' to 
reverse the situation it found itself in. No single drastic action on the scale of 
a demerging of the mobile arm has been undertaken. Instead, a series of 
actions have been undertaken that collectively have reduced KPN's debt to 
€16.5bn in February 2002 (CRAMB, 2002: 30). 
Since late 2001 KPN has sold assets, such as its holdings in Pannon, 
Eircom and Telkomsel, as it refocuses on its core operations and has used 
the raised funds to pay down debt. The sale of 10% of KPNQwest to Qwest 
not only freed funds for further debt reduction, but also enabled KPN to 
deconsolidate a further €430m from its balance sheet (KPN, 2001). In 
December 2001 KPN completed a €5bn rights issue. Included within this 
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was a contribution of €1.37bn from the Dutch government that maintained its 
stake at 34.7% (BICKERTON, 2001B: 33). 
It has also been speculated that KPN will sell E-Plus, but the company 
has denied this suggestion and reaffirmed its commitment to E-Plus 
(BENOIT, 2001: 28; Total Telecom, 2001). This may, of course, be nothing more 
than posturing to strengthen its bargaining position. KPN did receive at least 
one offer for E-Plus, which was described as being too low by the company's 
CEO (BICKERTON, 2001a: 30). In February 2002 BellSouth exercised its 
option to swap its 22.5% in E-Plus for shares in KPN (CRAMB, 2002: 30).  
Through the unravelling of the relationship between KPN and BellSouth, not 
only has the debt of KPN increased by €930m to €16.5bn but the repayment 
schedule on some of the debt has been accelerated. The accelerated debt 
repayment, as well as the overhang of 235m shares that BellSouth has 
publicly stated it wishes to sell to affect its retreat from Europe, ensured that 
when the deal was announced KPN shares slipped 4.25% (CRAMB, 2002: 30; 
GOLDSTEIN, 2001).  By consolidating its control over E-Plus, KPN is now in 
the position of being able to do something drastic. KPN could sell E-Plus, 
though with the present climate it is hard to see who would be a willing 
buyer. A stock based merger would resolve the E-Plus problem, though KPN 
would have to wait until the market recovers to maximise its financial return.  
However, the pressing nature of the debt burden ensures that KPN does not 
have the necessary leeway to wait for this to occur.  KPN will, therefore, opt 
for the outright sale approach. Although such a deal will quickly reduce the 
debt burden faced by KPN, it will do so at the expense of maximising the 
sum raised by the disposal. 
Table 1: Joint ventures among EU 3G licence winners 
with more than one telecommunications company present 
Country Joint venture Owners 
Austria Connect 17.5% Orange, 15% TDC 
France Vivendi / SFR 44% Vivendi Universal, 15% Vodafone, 26% mmO2, 
15% SBC Communications 
Germany Group 3G 42.8% Sonera, 57.2% Telefonica Moviles 
Italy IPSE 2000 12.5% Sonera, 45.9% Telefonica Moviles 
 Omnitel 77% Vodafone, 23% Verizon Communications 
Spain Retevision Movil 3.71% Telecom Italia Mobile, 22.6% Telecom Italia 
 Xfera 27.5% Vivendi Universal, 15% Sonera 
UK Hutchison 3G Holdings Ltd 65% Hutchison Whampoa, 20% NTT DoCoMo,  
15% KPN Mobile 
Source: http://www.TotalTele.com; various annual reports. 
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The 3G joint ventures that bring together two telecommunications 
companies are shown above in table 1. The table draws attention to the 
paradoxical nature of the relationship between Sonera and Telefonica 
Moviles. In two markets, Germany and Italy, Sonera and Telefonica Moviles 
are partners in 3G ventures. However, Sonera is a competitor to Telefonica 
Movies in its home market through its 17% holding in Xfera. In other words, 
Sonera and Telefonica Moviles are both collaborators as well as 
competitors. Until now, both companies have been able to reconcile the 
competitive and collaborative nature of their relationship, with no rumours 
emerging as to the strained nature of their relationship.  The comparative 
financial weakness of Sonera may, however, change the nature of its 
relationship with Telefonica Moviles. The sale of its stake in either IPSE 
2000 or Group 3G whilst retaining its stake in Xfera is likely to strain its 
relationship with Telefonica Moviles. The inevitable consequence of a 
strained relationship will be the dissolution of the joint ventures with the 
stronger partner, Telefonica Moviles, or expanding company, taking charge 
of the ventures. Conversely, the sale of Xfera whilst retaining the other two 
3G investments would strengthen its relationship with Telefonica Moviles. 
CHAN-OLMSTEAD & JAMIESON (2001) have recently described alliances 
formation in the telecommunications industry in terms of scale and scope.  
As scope is not relevant here, as all the investments are within the same 
sub-sector of the industry, what does the ownership structure of the 
successful licence bidders tell us about scale? In particular, have operators 
used the market entry opportunity that the licensing process represents to 
build for themselves a pan-regional network of investments across the EU.  
From table 2 over we can see that the scale of operators varies 
considerably. On the one hand there is Orange and Vodafone, which have 
invested across the EU with the apparent intention of creating a regional 
network of networks. Not only would this allow for roaming traffic to be 
internalised, but it would also enable a seamless service to be offered as 
well. The desire of both of these companies to introduce a seamless 
European service is demonstrated in the gradual re-branding of their 
national subsidiaries so that the same corporate image is presented across 
all of their markets. For instance, Vodafone has undertaken a re-branding 
exercise across Europe with the weaker brand names being replaced by 
'Vodafone' and the stronger brands such as Europolitan in Sweden being 
changed to Vodafone Europolitan. 
Interestingly neither Vodafone nor Orange have used the difficulties 
faced by the smaller telecommunications companies to expand the scale of 
their mobile operations across Europe. This is surprising given that the 
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pressing problems of the smaller companies, combined with declining asset 
values offers the opportunity for acquisitions to be made that fill in gaps in 
their respective networks. Instead Vodafone has taken the opportunity 
presented by the financial difficulties of BT to strengthen its position within 
what it views as a strategically important market, namely Spain, by acquiring 
control of Airtel. This highlights the recent trend in the telecommunications 
industry of joint ventures that split control between several companies to 
unravel as companies seek to take control of their investments. 
Table 2: Who owns stakes in 3G licences within the EU (*) (as of Feb 2002)?  
Country Orange Vodafone Hutchison 
Whampoa





Austria ?  ?   ? ? ? ? 
Belgium ?   ?      
Denmark ?  ?       
Finland     ?     
France ? ?        
Germany ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  
Greece  ?       ? 
Italy ? ? ?  ?   ? ? 
Neths ? ?  ?  ? ?   
Portugal ? ?        
Spain  ?   ?   ? ? 
Sweden ? ? ?       
UK ? ? ? ?  ? ?   
Total: 10 9 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 
(*) Luxembourg and Ireland have not yet awarded 3G licences.   
Vodafone is furthest along the path of gaining control of its mobile 
investments in the five key EU markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the UK). Vodafone is the majority or sole shareholder in its German, Italian, 
UK and Spanish mobile businesses. The exception is France where 
Vodafone is a minority shareholder in SFR, and appears unable or unwilling 
to increase its shareholding for fear of antagonising Vivendi with whom it 
collaborates in Vizzavi. In contrast, Orange is the majority or sole 
shareholder in its UK, Spanish and French mobile businesses. In the two 
remaining markets, Orange has a 26.6% stake in New Wind (Italy) and 
28.5% stake in MobilCom (Germany). Recent reports suggest that the 
relationship between Orange and MobilCom is far from harmonious, with the 
source of tension being the rate at which MobilCom is to roll out its 3G 
network across Germany (BENOIT, 2002: 29). Not only have doubts been cast 
on the ability of MobilCom to meet its forecasts in a crowded and competitive 
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market, but whether its management is wise to invest considerable sums in 
a market where consolidation may occur at some future point. 
On the other hand, there are the remaining multiple 3G licence owners 
like mmO2, T-Mobile and Sonera that have been successful in acquiring a 
few licences across the EU. However, regardless of whether they are large 
or small players within the telecommunications industry, they have at best 
gained only three licences in the largest five EU markets. As a consequence, 
the ability of these companies to offer pan-EU services that cover all of the 
major markets is severely limited. Because geographical coverage is a 
central aspect of business service provision, and is particularly lucrative, this 
lack of coverage in the key EU markets is likely to detrimentally affect mmO2 
etc. Corporate customers, as well as some residential customers, may leave 
the smaller operators in favour of these that can provide pan-EU networks. 
In the search for scale, a merger between one or more of the smaller 
operators is not unimaginable. Not only would increased scale bolster the 
position of operators regarding corporate customers who want pan-EU 
service providers, but it would enable them to capture both ends of roaming 
traffic as well. Increased scale may also help operators negotiate better 
deals with equipment manufacturers. However, which of the smaller 
operators are likely to merge? Any combination of mmO2, Hutchison 
Whampoa, KPN, Sonera and T-Mobile would involve investment overlap, 
and would therefore lead to some form of divestment. Whether any of these 
companies merge will be determined by their respective financial strength or 
weakness, the degree of overlap of their networks and the extent to which 
they are prepared to accept a reduced price for the overlapping assets. As 
many companies bought at the top of the market, their willingness to accept 
the lower values that presently prevail will largely shape whether or not they 
will partake in industry consolidation. Companies like KPN and Sonera need 
to resolve the financial pressures that they face, and have participated in 
industry consolidation and restructuring more by the need to reduce their 
debts than to shape any long term and sustainable strategy. The 
management of KPN for one has been more concerned with the need to 
reduce its debt burden, than reshaping its investment portfolio in a way that 
either maximises the amount raised or does so in a way that is strategically 
sustainable in the long-term. Although the debt burden of KPN has been 
reduced its investments increasingly lack strategic coherence and the 
problem of E-Plus remains unresolved. 
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Differences in financial strength, network overlap and the prices that they 
are prepared to accept ensure that any merger will be complex and prone to 
failure, especially if two of the weaker companies seek to merge. For 
example, in the case of a merger between mmO2 and Sonera the degree of 
overlap would be limited to just the German market (Viag Interkom and 
Group 3G respectively). Any merger would require the divestment of one of 
these two companies; the sale of struggling Viag would not command a high 
price and would weaken any claims that the merged company could make to 
being present in all of the key EU markets. A sale would also relieve the 
merged company of one of its key assets: customers. Group 3G is a new 
entrant, and presently does not have any customers. Sonera could hand 
over its share in Group 3G to Telefonica Moviles, or sell it to a third party, 
but the price fetched is likely to be small. Such a move is also likely to 
antagonise Telefonica Moviles, who would be a partner of the merged 
company in Italy and a competitor in Spain. One possible resolution to the 
difficulties with Telefonica Moviles would be a three-way merger between its 
European operations, mmO2 and Sonera. Whilst the resulting company 
would have a presence in all of the key European markets, such a merger 
would be unprecedented, difficult to structure and subject to such intense 
scrutiny that only the most determined management would be able to see it 
through to completion. Whether the management of mmO2, Sonera and 
Telefonica Moviles is capable of doing this in today's climate is unknown. 
Conclusions 
As we have demonstrated above, the advent of 3G has wrought changes 
in the structure and organisation of the telecommunications industry. The 
immediate aftermath of the licensing process saw the debt of 
telecommunications companies rise dramatically and their debt ratings fall, 
as the uncertainty surrounding 3G increased. A wide variety of 
commentators expressed their concern as to the underlying technology of 
3G and the validity of market and service predictions made during the 
licensing process. Although these concerns cast serious doubt on 3G in their 
own right, they are more important because they have set in train a series of 
events that will have long term structural and organisational affects on the 
telecommunications industry. 
The long term structural and organisational affects of 3G fall into three 
broad areas.  Firstly, to mitigate the cost of building national networks some 
of the successful bidders have agreed to share infrastructure with one 
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another. Until now the 'norm' within the mobile telecommunications has been 
that licence holders each build their own network, but the uncertainty 
associated with 3G is increasingly forcing companies to think again about 
whether it is necessary to own a network that covers all of the market. 
Whilst the sharing of network infrastructure between companies allows 
them to reduce the cost of fulfilling their licence conditions, it also raises 
questions as to the nature of competition within mobile telecommunications 
markets. Presumably, when regulators offered four or five licences they 
thought that this number was necessary for a competitive market, and that 
this market would be characterised by infrastructure competition. What is 
now emerging is a mobile market with different characteristics from that 
initially envisaged, for whilst service competition remains the same with five 
or six companies in the market they are at times utilising the same 
infrastructure. This raises questions as to whether the new market will be as 
competitive as thought; will the presence of shared infrastructure lead to 
collusion between companies, or will service competition be unaffected by 
co-operation in the provision of the underlying infrastructure? 
Secondly, companies have begun to restructure themselves as they 
struggle to come to terms with their new, higher, levels of debt. Part of this 
restructuring is, of course, demonstrated in their newfound willingness to 
enter into network sharing collaborative relationships with others in the 
marketplace. However, the restructuring has gone further than this with the 
most drastic example of restructuring being the decision of BT to voluntarily 
split itself into a UK focused fixed network company on the one hand (Future 
BT) and a European focused wireless company on the other (mmO2).  
Whether BT would have adopted its divestment strategy without the effect of 
3G is unknown. Without 3G the overall debt burden of BT would have been 
considerably less, with the consequence that it would not have faced the 
same pressure to divest assets worldwide and would have had access to 
financial resources to counter the expansionary moves of Vodafone in Spain 
and Japan. However, prior to 3G, BT had begun to think publicly about its 
organisational form and how it could be changed to alleviate some of the 
mainly financial pressures facing the company. In early 2000 it began the 
process that culminated in the divestment of mmO2 when it re-organised 
itself into five divisions and senior executives openly commented that this 
would increase transparency and aid the floatation or sale of divisions if 
required. The role of 3G, therefore, is one of exacerbating the pressures 
facing BT and increasing the urgency with which it looked at, and then 
implemented, the radical structural solution of separating the fixed from 
wireless and effected a retreat from markets around the world. 
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Thirdly, the telecommunications industry, within the European Union if 
not elsewhere, may be on the verge of consolidating around a smaller 
number of players that importantly operate on a greater scale than has 
hitherto been the case.  Such consolidation would not be out of step with 
that going on in other parts of the telecommunications industry; for example, 
the European Internet Service Provider (ISP) market is consolidating around 
five companies (CURWEN, 2001a). However, who will be the five or so 
surviving companies? Given their size and present scale both Orange and 
Vodafone will be among the surviving companies. However, identifying the 
other surviving companies is somewhat more difficult. In the short term 
Sonera, KPN and mmO2 all face significant, possibly insurmountable, 
problems that they must address and which may result in their 
independence being surrendered. Thus, their role in consolidation is more 
likely to be as the acquired than the acquiring company. Of the other 
companies, Hutchison Whampoa could play a role in consolidation but this is 
unlikely given its reputation as a financial investor and its reluctance to 
threaten its own balance sheet. Financial burdens may also prevent  
T-Mobile from participating in any consolidation. When combined with the 
seemingly never ending decline in the price of telecommunications stocks, 
this is likely to mean that consolidation will be delayed as companies 
preserve their capital and the stronger companies hold back from beginning 
the consolidation process in the hope that prices will drop further. This does 
not mean that the consolidation process will not happen, but that it may be 
precipitous to talk about the consolidation process as being imminent. 




- (2001): "KPN dismisses E-Plus sell-off speculation."  Financial Times.  September 
13th, 28. 
- (2002): "MobilCom hints it may defer 3G launch to 2003."  Financial Times.  
February 1st, 29. 
BENOIT B & MALKANI G.: 
-  (2001a):  "BT and Deutsche Telekom to share 3G networks."  Financial Times.  
June 12th. 
- (2001b):  "Fast-moving BT and DT will need patience to reap savings."  Financial 
Times.  June 13th, 27. 
BICKERTON I.: 
-  (2001a):  "New KPN chief delays revamp plans."  Financial Times.  September 
11th, 30. 
- (2001b):  "KPN investors approve €5bn share issue."  Financial Times.  December 
7th, 33. 
BROWNE-HUMES C.  (2001):  "Telia ruling points to Nordic shake-up."  Financial 
Times.  May 30th, 28. 
CHAN-OLMSTED S. & JAMIESON M.  (2001):  "Rivalry Through Alliances – 
Competitive Strategies in the Global Telecommunications Market."  European 
Management Journal.  Vol.19(3), 317-331. 
CRAMB G.  (2002):  "KPN in deal to control E-Plus."  Financial Times.  January 31st, 
30. 
CURWEN P.: 
- (2001a):  "Anyone for European five-a-side?"  Info.  The journal of policy, regulation 
and strategy for telecommunications information and media.  Vol.3(2), 183-184. 
- (2001b):  "An analysis of recent structural and strategic issues in 
telecommunications."  Info.  The journal of policy, regulation and strategy for 
telecommunications information and media.  Vol.3(5), 381-405. 
DOMBEY D.: 
-  (2001a):  "Ministers warm to boost for 3G licences." Financial Times. June 28th, 8. 
- (2001b):  "Brussels warms to 3G 'network sharing' plans." Financial Times.  July 
26th, 2. 
- (2001c): "Taking a line on network sharing."  Financial Times.  August 3th, 5. 
The Economist  (2001):  "Pass the painkillers."  May 5th, 71-72. 
GEORGE N.: 
- (2001a):  "Swedish groups link up over 3G."  Financial Times.  January 24th, 34. 
- (2001b): "Sonera abandons 3G plans and returns licence." Financial Times.  August 
10th.  URL – http://www.ft.com.  Site visited on August 10th 2001. 
194 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES no. 45 
GEORGE N., CRISCIONE V. & MacCARTHY C.  (2001): "Telenor, Telia and TDC 
vie for top-dog position."  Financial Times.  May 17th, 33. 
GEORGE N. & MacCARTHY C.  (2001):  "Nordic telecoms operators find that linking 
up is hard to do."  Financial Times.  August 2nd, 31. 
GOLDSTEIN T.  (2001): "BellSouth to sell stakes in mobile phones." Financial Times.  
August 29th.  URL – http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/.  Site visited on 21st 
September 2001. 
KPN (2001):  KPN to sell 10% of its stake in KPNQwest to Qwest.  Press release.  
18th October. URL – http://www.kpn-corporate.com/eng/pers/pess/selective. Site 
visited on 14th February, 2002. 
RegTP  (2001): Press release - UMTS infrastructure sharing possible under certain 
conditions.  June 5th.  URL - http://www.regtp.de/en.  Site visited on June 6th 2001. 
ROBERTS D.:  
- (2001a): "Vodafone warns of limited 3G services." Financial Times. September 7th, 1.   
- (2001b): "Threatened by a younger generation."  Financial Times.  March 28th, 23. 
Sonera: 
-  (2001): Sonera reassesses its Norwegian 3G business. August 9th.  URL – 
http://www.sonera.fi/english/pressinfo/releases. Site visited on 10th September 2001. 
- (2002): Sonera Corporation's Financial Statement Bulletin 2001. February 6th.  URL 
– http://www.sonera.fi/english/pressinfo/releases/engsonera2002/. Site visited on 
18th February 2002. 
STENEBERG K. (2001):  "Telias storaffär: Det börjar med Sonera."  Dagens Industri.  
June 8th. 
Total Telecom  (2001):  "KPN rules out E-Plus sale, plans 3G network share".  URL – 
http//:www.totaltele.com.  Site visited on 20th September 2001. 
